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It is generally accepted that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme relies on domestic supplies of 
uranium. Although constraints on uranium supply in Pakistan are recognized, this is often not  
taken into account when estimating the amount of fissile material that Pakistan may have produced. 
In simple words, most assessments of Pakistan’s fissile materials and arsenal size fail to look at the 
supply and demand situations in Pakistan in an integrated way. This paper attempts to rectify this 
lacuna by taking a combined look at the supply and demand situations for uranium in Pakistan. It 
specifically addresses issues of how shortages in supply or increases in demand will affect the allo-
cation of available uranium resources for meeting various military and civilian needs. 
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PAKISTAN’S nuclear weapon capabilities and the size of 
its arsenal is a major area of international concern. The 
amount of fissile material that a country possesses, directly 
determines the number of nuclear weapons that it can 
make. The International Panel for Fissile Materials 
(IPFM), that provides data on the stockpile of fissile  
material held by various countries is the standard source 
used by analysts for estimating the size of Pakistan’s  
nuclear arsenal. IPFM also provides periodic updates to 
its stockpile reports and their implications for the number 
of nuclear weapons. 
 The IPFM estimates that at the end of 2014, Pakistan 
had approximately 3100 kg of highly enriched uranium 
(HEU), and 190 kg of Weapons grade Plutonium (WgPu). 
In its earlier report of 2010, IPFM said that Pakistan had 
a stockpile of approximately 2600 kg of HEU and 100 kg 
of WgPu. This implies that Pakistan added 500 kg of 
HEU and 90 kg of WgPu in four years between 2010 and 
2014. 
 According to IPFM, this translates into an arsenal of 
120 to 130 warheads made up of both HEU and pluto-
nium weapons as of end 2010. Most analysts studying the 
nuclear weapons programme in South Asia use these  
estimates to determine the number of warheads in Pakis-
tan. This data is also widely used in most narratives on 
nuclear deterrence to reinforce the dangers of a nuclear 
arms race in the region. 
 As a trend, the IPFM estimates show that the amount 
of fissile materials in Pakistan is increasing. Though 
some researchers like Zia Mian1 suggest that Pakistan 
could face uranium fuel constraints for their Khushab  
reactors, this does not seem to be factored into IPFM  
projections. The underlying assumption seems to be that 
Pakistan has adequate supplies of domestic uranium to 
meet all its needs. 
 While there could be problems with supply, there is no 
need to doubt that the demand for uranium has been  
increasing in Pakistan. One of the problems in estimating 
the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has been that, most 
assessments of fissile materials and arsenal size fail to 
look at the supply and demand situations in Pakistan in an 
integrated way. 
 A major question that has continued to bother the Indian 
strategic community has been ‘How much fissile material 
does Pakistan really possess’? Trying to find an answer to 
this question needs a number of other issues to be  
addressed. These are: 
 
• The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) elec-
tricity producing reactor began operations in 1971 and 
continues to work till today. Since 1980 it has  
depended on domestically produced fuel for its work-
ing. Can we estimate the amount of uranium that is 
needed for operating KANUPP on a continuing basis? 
• Can we estimate the amount of HEU that Pakistan 
could have produced since the start of operations at 
the Kahuta enrichment facility? 
• How much weapon grade plutonium has Pakistan pro-
duced since the start of the Khushab reactor complex 
in 1996? 
• How much yellowcake has Pakistan produced2? 
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The purpose of this study is to find an answer to each of 
these questions and then make an assessment of Pakis-
tan’s nuclear arsenal. The analysis presented here is 
based on publicly available information on Pakistan,  
together with a few assumptions. All our estimates are 
based on yellowcake (U3O8) requirements. 
Estimating demand 
There are three major facilities in Pakistan that need to be 
fed with domestically produced yellowcake. These are 
the KANUPP civilian reactor, the enrichment facility at 
Kahuta and the plutonium production reactors at the Khu-
shab complex. While the KANUPP reactor is under safe-
guards, the Kahuta complex and the Khushab reactors are 
outside the purview of safeguards. 
 The enrichment facility in Kahuta started operations in 
1984. There is a lot of uncertainty about the number and 
type of centrifuges housed within this facility. Some  
assumptions are therefore needed for estimating the  
demand. Though Pakistan probably has more than one 
enrichment facility, we will only consider the major facility  
at Kahuta. Additional enrichment facilities would only 
mean that the demand for yellowcake would increase. 
Our demand estimates are in that sense quite conservative 
and the actual demand may be even higher. 
 The Khushab complex has four plutonium reactors  
referred to as K1, K2, K3 and K4. All of them are iden-
tical. K1 began operations in 1996, K2 in 2010, K3 in 
2013 and K4 in 2015. 
KANUPP reactor demand 
Pakistan began construction of its first Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP), KANUPP, in 1966 at Karachi. The plant 
was connected to the national grid on 18 October 1971. 
KANUPP, a Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU)  
design reactor of 137 MW was constructed by Canadian 
General Electric (CGE) under a turnkey contract. 
 After India’s first nuclear test of 1974, Canada with-
drew support and cut off fuel supplies to KANUPP in 
1976. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 
then undertook the manufacture of some spares and fuel 
rods on an emergency basis. KANUPP has been using 
domestic fuel since 1980. Though KANUPP uses indige-
nously developed fuel elements, it continues to operate 
under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-
guards3. 
 There are different ways of estimating the amount of 
fuel required for a nuclear reactor of the KANUPP type. 
Ideally if we know the total number of fuel bundles 
loaded in the reactor, then a straightforward estimate of 
the fuel could be obtained. This is rarely available. If we 
knew the effective full power days of operation, then an 
estimate of the fuel required could be obtained assuming 
other reactor characteristics. Another standard method of 
calculating the fuel required is based on the installed 
electric capacity, the number of days of operation,  
thermal efficiency and the burn-up rate4. 
 The fuel needed for KANUPP reactor depends on reac-
tor power, the capacity factor and the fuel burn-up. The 
KANUPP reactor is designed for a high burn-up (average 
7500 MWt.d/ton) with the fuel staying in the reactor for 
more than a year. It is possible to estimate the fuel  
required for such a reactor by assuming the burn-up, the 
thermal efficiency, the number of days of operation and 
the cumulative generation of thermal energy that is avail-
able from the IAEA data5. 
 The effective full power years (EFPY) of KANUPP by 
end 2002 amounted to only 10.8 according to PakAtom, a 
Newsletter of PAEC put out in January–February 2003. 
This would mean that KANUPP on an average operated 
for only 150 days in a year. Hence for our purpose, we 
calculate the fuel requirement for 150 days. 
 Using the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)6 
data base, we estimate that the total amount of yellow-
cake required to fuel KANUPP for the period 1980–2014 
is 805 tonnes. This is based on an average of 150 operat-
ing days in a year. 
Demand by Kahuta enrichment plant 
The primary Pakistani fissile-material production facility 
is located at Kahuta. It uses gas centrifuge enrichment 
technology to produce HEU. This facility started operat-
ing in 1984. The amount of feed required for an enrich-
ment plant will depend on the Separative Work Unit 
(SWU) available, the type of centrifuges used, the per-
centage of enrichment desired, and the percentage of tail-
ings. For Pakistan many of these characteristics are 
unknown. Yet, estimates of the cumulative amount of 
HEU are available in open source literature. One of the 
IPFM reports estimates that Pakistan could have pro-
duced 1750 kg of HEU over a period of thirty years. This 
is equivalent to producing 58 kg of HEU annually. By as-
suming different SWU values and different tailings per-
centages, the feed required to produce 58 kg of HEU 
annually7 can be calculated. Table 1 shows the possible 
scenarios. 
 From Table 1, we can see that an amount of 58 kg of 
HEU can be obtained with a capacity of 13,000 SWU at 
0.2% tails, or with a capacity of 11,000 SWU at 0.3% 
tails or with a capacity of 9000 SWU at 0.5% tails. The 
corresponding feed for these cases will be 10, 12 and 
25 tonnes respectively. For our calculations, we assume a 
HEU product with a 0.3% tails. A capacity of 11,000 SWU 
with a tailing fraction of 0.3% will produce about 57 kg 
of HEU. The uranium feed required for achieving this is 
12.4 tonnes. This is equivalent to a feed of 15.5 tonnes of 
yellowcake annually. On this basis the yellowcake
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Table 1. Feed–product from an enrichment plant for different SWU 
  0.2% Tails 0.3% Tails 0.5% Tails 
 
SWU (kg) Feed (tonnes) Product (kg) Feed (tonnes) Product (kg) Feed (tonnes) Product (kg) 
 
 9000 7.0 39.6 10.2 46.6 24.8 58.4 
10,000 7.7 44.0 11.3 51.8 27.5 64.9 
11,000 8.5 48.4 12.4 57.0 30.3 71.4 
12,000 9.3 52.8 13.6 62.2 33.0 77.9 
13,000 10.1 57.2 14.7 67.4 35.8 84.3 
 
Table 2. Estimated annual yellowcake demand in Pakistan 
  Annual demand Cumulative demand 
Facility Period (tonnes) (tonnes) Assumptions 
 
KANUPP 1980–2014 23.0 805 7500 MWd/T burn up, 150 days operation, 30% efficiency 
Kahuta 1984–2014 15.5 481 SWU – 11000 kg/ year, 0.3% tailings, product HEU 57 kg average per year 
Khushab 1 1996–2014 23.0 437 Capacity 50 MWt, burn up 1 MWd/kg, 100% reactor availability 
Khushab 2 2010–2014 23.0 115 Capacity 50 MWt, burn up 1 MWd/kg, 100% reactor availability 
Khushab 3 2013–2014 23.0 46 Capacity 50 MWt, burn up 1 MWd/kg, 100% reactor availability 
Total 1980–2014  1884 Total demand – civilian and military uses 
 
demand for enrichment purposes works out to be 
481 tonnes for the period 1984–2014. 
Demand from the Khushab plutonium  
production reactors 
Khushab reactors also rely exclusively on domestic natu-
ral uranium. They are heavy water natural uranium reac-
tors with a capacity of approximately 50 MWt. Since they 
are dedicated reactors for producing plutonium, they will 
operate with a low burn-up of 1000 MWd/T (ref. 8). Our 
estimate for this burn-up and the rated power capacity is 
that each Khushab reactor will need 18.25 tonnes of natu-
ral uranium or about 23 tonnes of yellowcake per year  
assuming a reactor availability of 100%. Pakistan started 
the first Khushab reactor in 1996. The second came up in 
2010, the third in 2013 and the fourth in 2015. All the 
four reactors are identical. Therefore the feed require-
ments are expected to be the same. For the period 1996–
2014 this translates into 26 reactor years of operations. 
Assuming that each reactor is fuelled once a year, Pakis-
tan required 598 tonnes of yellowcake for operating these 
reactors till 2014. 
Overall demand 
The total demand for yellowcake in Pakistan to operate 
these three facilities till the end of 2014 thus works out to 
be 1884 tonnes. The demand scenario is summarized in 
Table 2. 
Uranium supply in Pakistan 
Assuming an uranium ore grade of 0.05% and a milling 
capacity of 300 tonnes of ore per day in Dera Ghazi 
Khan, we estimate that Pakistan could have produced 
54 tonnes of yellowcake annually during the period 
1980–2005. This is probably the maximum amount of 
yellowcake that Pakistan could have produced. Actual 
production may be less, because ore grades of Pakistan 
uranium deposits are likely to be even lower than what 
we have assumed. 
 Although the Bagalchur mine closed in 2000, we  
expect that the mill would have processed the ores for 
another five years. On this basis one would expect Paki-
stan to have a cumulative supply of 1405 tonnes of  
yellowcake9 from the Bagalchur mine. 
 Pakistan also procured 110 tonnes of yellowcake from 
Niger in the seventies and produces some yellowcake 
from the three ISL mines10 located at Qabul Khel, Nangar 
Nai and Taunsa. Adding all these together, the cumula-
tive (total) amount of yellowcake available in Pakistan 
till 2014 has been estimated to be 1584 tonnes. 
Matching supply and demand (1980–2014) 
Assuming that KANUPP operated for 150 days a year on 
an average, the total (cumulative) demand for yellowcake 
in Pakistan to feed the three facilities mentioned above is 
1884 tonnes. As against this demand, Pakistan would 
have produced 1584 tonnes of yellowcake cumulatively 
till 2014. 
 Figure 1 shows the curves of cumulative supply and 
demand for yellowcake for the period 1980–2014. Figure 
1 also provides a timeline of major events that could have 
affected the supply demand equations for uranium in  
Pakistan. Other geo-political factors such as the fissile 
materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) that could affect the allo-
cation of available uranium resources amongst conflicting 
demands are also indicated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative uranium supply and demand scenario in Pakistan (1980–2014). 
 
 We can see from Figure 1 that there is a steady supply 
of yellowcake between 1980 and 2005, after which the 
supply curve reaches a plateau. An inflexion in the curve 
in 2005 depicts this. This is due to the closure of the Ba-
galchur uranium mine in 2000 and the end of milling op-
erations at Dera Ghazi Khan in 2005. 
 There is an inflexion in the demand curve in 1996, 
which is the start of the operation of the first Khushab 
reactor. Between 1996 and 2005, Pakistan required about 
40 tonnes of yellowcake annually for its weapons  
programmes, which was met by domestic supply. The 
figure also clearly shows that from 2010, the cumulative 
demand curve overtakes the cumulative supply curve  
creating a supply crunch. The problems in uranium 
supply began in 2005 and became severe from 2010. 
 It is quite likely that this emerging supply constraint 
was anticipated by Pakistani decision makers. One would 
therefore expect them to take steps to minimize the  
impact of these shortages on their key weapons  
programmes. The allocation of available yellowcake 
amongst the three programmes therefore becomes a criti-
cal factor in the determination of the arsenal size. 
KANUPP – high priority demand 
The production of electricity in a power short economy 
will obviously be a very high priority. The KANUPP  
civilian reactor would have needed 805 tonnes of yellow-
cake for its continuing operations till the end of 2014.  
After taking it out as a high priority need Pakistan would 
have been left with 780 tonnes of yellowcake for use in 
its weapons programme. 
Choice between HEU and plutonium 
The available yellowcake after taking out the demand 
from the civilian KANUPP electricity producing reactor 
had to be distributed between the production of HEU and 
plutonium. 
 The enrichment programme is older and started in 
1984. Since Pakistan has only tested HEU weapons, the 
production of HEU to build up an arsenal would have 
been a high priority activity for quite some time. Till the 
start of the first Khushab reactor in 1996, it would have 
remained the only major demand. It would have contin-
ued to be important after the 1998 tests also, since HEU 
would be needed for building an arsenal. However since 
enough yellowcake is available to feed both the enrich-
ment facility as well as the single operational Khushab 
reactor, one would expect that the demands of both would 
be met from the yellowcake inventory11. 
 The Kargil crisis, Operation Parakaram and India’s 
Cold Start Doctrine would have forced a rethink amongst 
Pakistan’s strategic thinkers on the role of nuclear weapons 
in the prevention and deterrence of war. The need for  
developing plutonium-based tactical weapons would have 
become a major priority. The discussions on the Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty in Geneva that became more 
prominent after 2005 may have also had a role in Pakis-
tan’s decision to increase development focus on plutonium 
weapons. The decision on the second Khushab reactor 
followed by the setting up of a third and fourth reactors 
provides concrete evidence of this shift in focus. We can 
presume that the priority shifted from HEU and Kahuta 
decisively towards plutonium and the Khushab reactors 
around 2005. This would imply a token allocation of
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Figure 2. Distribution of yellowcake for HEU and plutonium production. 
 
 
yellowcake to keep the Kahuta enrichment facilities tick-
ing 2005 onwards with the bulk of yellowcake resources 
conserved or used for plutonium production. Figure 2 re-
flects the distribution of the yellowcake resources availa-
ble for the weapons programme based on this revised 
allocation of priorities. 
 Figure 2 makes it clear that after the concurrent opera-
tion of the Khushab 1 and Khushab 2 reactors for 2010 
and 2011, Pakistan would have again faced a uranium 
supply side crunch by 2012. 
 From 2012 onwards even after the setting up of the 
fourth Khushab reactor in 2015, Pakistan would only 
have had sufficient Uranium supplies to feed one of the 
Khushab reactors every two to three years. Any estimates 
of arsenal size would have to take into account this shift 
in priorities from HEU to Plutonium, as well as the pos-
sibility, that Pakistan would have a serious shortage of 
uranium yellowcake to feed its growing demands for nuc-
lear weapons. 
Pakistan’s stockpile of HEU and WgPu 
If we take the scenario outlined in Figure 2, where  
enrichment was carried out continuously from 1984 to 
2005 and stopped thereafter, the amount of HEU in  
Pakistan amounts to 1254 kg. Since under this scenario, 
no significant quantities of yellowcake would be made 
available for enrichment after 2005, this would be the  
total stock of HEU available with Pakistan for production 
of nuclear weapons. 
 Assuming a cooling period of two years for the spent 
fuel from the Khushab reactors, it can be estimated that 
Khushab 1 would have produced 15.5 kg of WgPu  
annually from 1998. This reactor would have continued 
to operate on a continuous basis till 2011. 
 The second Khushab reactor became operational in 
2010 and would have operated concurrently with the 
Khushab 1 reactor in 2010 and 2011. The fuel from this 
reactor too would have become available in 2012 and 
2013 after a cooling of period of two years. 
 By 2012, the available supply of yellowcake was not 
enough to fuel even one of the Khushab reactors. One 
would have to wait till 2014 for enough fuel to accumu-
late before one of the four Khushab reactors could be  
operated. It is likely that the plutonium from one reactor 
would become available to the weapons programme  
before our cut-off date of 2014 for estimation of the  
arsenal size. 
 According to this scenario Pakistan could have accu-
mulated 295 kg of weapon grade plutonium from all the 
Khushab reactors by 2014. This estimate represents the 
amount of weapons-grade plutonium present in the spent 
nuclear fuel and not the actual amount of weapons grade 
plutonium available after reprocessing. If we assume a 
reprocessing and recovery efficiency of 70% (ref. 12) for 
the irradiated fuel from the reactors, the estimated 
amount of plutonium for the period 1996–2014, would be 
206 kg. 
 Based on this assessment we estimate that the amount 
of HEU available with Pakistan at the end of 2014 is 
1254 kg. The amount of weapon grade plutonium that 
Pakistan possessed as of 2014 end is estimated to be 
206 kg. 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal 
Table 3 provides estimates of the arsenal size as of end 
2014. Here we have considered the scenario where both 
enrichment and plutonium production operations pro-
gressed till 2010 leading to an accumulation of 1482 kg
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Table 3. Estimates of nuclear weapons in Pakistan 
 HEU weapons Plutonium weapons 
 
  18 kg per weapon 12 kg per weapon 6 kg per Weapon 4 kg per weapon Total weapons 
 
This paper (2014)  78 104 34 52 112–156 
Kristensen (2014) 172 258 32 48 204–306 
 
 
of HEU and 154 kg of weapon grade plutonium. The non-
availability of yellowcake beyond 2010 makes it impera-
tive that these estimates of nuclear weapons are valid as 
of 2014. The HEU arsenal is based on the use of 12–
18 kg of HEU per weapon. The plutonium arsenal is 
based on the use of 4–6 kg of plutonium per weapon. 
These are the same range of values as used by Kristensen 
and Norris13 in their assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear  
arsenal. Table 3 provides their estimates as well to facili-
tate easy comparisons14. 
 As we can see from Table 3 our estimates are signifi-
cantly lower than those provided by Kristensen and  
Norris13. We believe that because of uranium shortages, 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has reached a plateau and can 
only grow very slowly. Any alternative explanation for an 
increased arsenal size should provide a satisfactory and 
consistent explanation for uranium sourcing by Pakistan. 
 If we were to go with the scenario described in Figure 
2, where the enrichment process is put on hold in 2005, 
the HEU arsenal size will be even smaller without signif-
icant increase in the number of plutonium weapons. With 
1254 kg of HEU and 206 kg of weapon grade plutonium, 
Pakistan could have a total of 104 to 156 weapons of both 
kinds. 
 It is evident that if Pakistan wants to increase its arsen-
al; it makes more sense for Pakistan to go for HEU  
weapons especially when there is a uranium constraint. 
For tactical use, it may still need to miniaturize and there-
fore a plutonium base for nuclear weapons may also be 
needed. In spite of this logic, one has to question the cre-
dibility as to why Pakistan chose to build and operate 
four Khushab reactors to feed its nuclear weapons  
programme. 
Implications 
(i) The available evidence suggests that Pakistan has  
severe uranium constraints and could not have pursued 
both the HEU and the plutonium routes as vigorously as 
is generally believed. 
 (ii) In a business-as-usual scenario, the constraint  
appears to have become serious in year 2010. It is likely 
that Pakistani decision-makers would have become aware 
of this emerging shortage and acted to minimize its  
impact on the weapons programme. The Kargil crisis, 
Operation Parakram, India’s Cold Start Doctrine and  
negotiations in Geneva on the FMCT would have also 
forced Pakistan to review its nuclear weapons pro-
gramme. It is most likely that under these circumstances 
there was a shift in focus from HEU weapons to pluto-
nium-based weapons. This would have entailed a reduc-
tion in the production of HEU and an increase in the 
production of plutonium around 2006. 
 (iii) In our assessment, Pakistan would have accumu-
lated 1254 kg of HEU by the end of 2014. The corres-
ponding IPFM estimate for HEU in Pakistan is 2700 kg 
by the end of 2014. 
 (iv) Correspondingly, the available Pu in spent fuel is 
estimated to be 295 kg. After taking into account the  
reprocessing efficiency (70%), our estimate of weapon 
grade plutonium works out to be 206 kg. According to 
Feiveson et al.15, as of the end of 2012, Pakistan could 
have produced 100–200 kg of weapon grade plutonium. 
IPFM estimates that by the end of 2014, Pakistan would 
have accumulated 190 kg of WgPu. 
 (v) It is possible that Pakistan may be operating the 
enrichment facility to stockpile low enriched uranium 
(LEU 20%), for quick conversion to HEU at a later stage. 
If this were so, the HEU amounts in Pakistan would be 
even less than what we have estimated and therefore the 
arsenal would be even smaller. 
 (vi) The IPFM report of 2008 mentions the possibility 
of Pakistan’s enrichment programme facing the brunt  
of shortages when the Khushab reactors go online. To 
quote16: 
 
‘Pakistan’s annual HEU production capacity is con-
strained, however, by its limited domestic production 
of natural uranium (currently about 40 tonnes per year) 
and the need to also fuel its Khushab plutonium pro-
duction reactor, which requires about 13 tonnes per 
year. This natural uranium constraint will become more 
significant when the second and third production reac-
tors at Khushab come online. The three reactors will 
then require virtually all of the natural uranium that  
Pakistan produces.’ These constraints are, however, not 
reflected in the subsequent estimates of fissile materials 
in Pakistan. 
 
(vii) We estimate that Pakistan could at best have a total 
of between 112 and 156 nuclear weapons. Of this, about 
78–104 would be HEU weapons and 34–52 would be plu-
tonium weapons. This estimate is significantly lower than 
the estimates available in public domain. 
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 (viii) In the analysis presented, the weak link is the 
amount of fuel required by KANUPP. If we were to  
assume that the number of operating days of working as 
100 instead of 150 days assumed earlier, the total amount 
of fuel demand will be 537 tonnes. This suggests that  
Pakistan would have an additional 268 tonnes of yellow-
cake available for its weapons programme. What would 
this mean in terms of the nuclear arsenal? Firstly, the 
enrichment facility can run for three more years along 
with Khushabs 1, 2 and 3. Equivalently the number of 
HEU weapons would become 90–120 as against 78–104 
estimated earlier. The number of plutonium weapons 
would be 50–78 as against 34–52 estimated earlier.  
Essentially, the constraint on uranium merely gets post-
poned by a few years and does not go away. 
 (ix) Despite these constraints, if Pakistan is indeed 
producing the amount of fissile materials as reported in 
the open source literature, the question of Pakistan’s  
uranium sourcing especially after 2010 has to be addressed. 
Without a deeper understanding of this sourcing, it is dif-
ficult to believe that Pakistan has the arsenal it is reported 
to possess. 
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